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TRUSTS CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS
AND LIKE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION Plaintiff hired a seismograph

company to make surveys of certain land for the purpose of locating oil and
gas. The results of the survey were favorable. An employee of the seismograph
. company communicated· the results to the defendant who thereafter leased the
land. Plaintiff brought suit to have defendant declared constructive trustee of
the land for plaintiff. Held, that the relief could not be granted since defendant
might have leased the land without such information. 0 hio Oil Co. v. Sharp,
(D. C. Okla. 1942) 45 F. Supp. 969.
It would not seem an undue extension of the term to call information obtained
by such a survey a trade secret. 1 There can be no doubt that secrecy was intended and that the information was considered as a possible source of profit.
Equity has quite generally afforded protection to trade secrets when it has been
feasi~le to do so. 2 Thus when an employee communicates a trade secret of his
employer to a third party who has notice of the employee's breach of duty, or
who does not pay value, equity will enjoin the third party from using the information.8 This being so, there would seem to be no good reason for refusing

1 In the usual case the trade secret is a secret process, Harvey Co. v. National
Drug Co., 75 App. Div. 103, 77 N. Y. S. 674 (1902), or a customer list, Stevens &
Company v. Stiles, 29 R. I. 399, 71 A. 802 (1909). See 42 HARV. L. REv. 254
(1928) for an attempt at definition.
2 23 CoL. L. REV. 164 (1923); 42 HARV. L. REv. 254 (1928); 37 YALE
L. J. II54 (1928).
8 Stewart v. Hook, II8 Ga. 445, 45 S. E. 369 (1903); Elaterite Paint & Mfg.
Co. v. S. E. Frost Co., 105 Minn. 239, II7 N. W. 388 (1906); Eastern Extracting
Co. v. Greater New York Extracting Co., 126 App. Div. 928, IIO N. Y. S. 738
(1908).
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relief simply because the person to whom the trade secret was communicated
has already used the information to his advantage, providing that it is practical
to give relief under such circumstances. This was recognized in one decision
requiring the defendant to account to the plaintiff for profits realized from the
trade secret.4 While the relationship of the parties in the principal case was not
that of employer and employee, their respective duties would seem to be the
same. Once it has been decided that relief should be granted in such a case there
would seem to be no valid objection to using the constructive trust device for
this purpose. Defined broadly, a constructive trust is a remedial device used
by equity to compel one who unfairly holds a property interest to convey it to
another who is entitled thereto. 5 The fact that there are no precedents for the
use of the device under the circumstancs of the instant case would seem of little
significance since the courts have refused to define the limits of the remedy. 6
Moreover, constructive trusts have often been used to prevent unjust enrichment
resulting from the breach of a fiduciary duty, 'whether the enrichment accrues to
the fiduciary 7 or to a third party who has knowledge of the breach of duty. 8
An employee is generally regarded as a fiduciary with respect to the trade secrets
communicated to him by his employer,9 and an employee of the survey company would seem equally a fiduciary with_ respect to confidential information
obtained for a client. However, before a constructive trust can be imposed under
such circumstances as presented by the principal case, it would seem necessary
to decide two fact questions to determine whether the defendant actually does
hold a property interest which in equity and good conscience should belong to
the plaintiff. First, would the plaintiff have leased the property but for the
action of the ~efendant? The most troublesome consideration on this question
would seem to be the possibility that the lessor might refuse to lease to the
plaintiff. Second, would the defendant have leased the property but for the
information he received through the employee's breach of duty? If so, then the
relief should, of course, be denied because the defendant's enrichment did not
result from the employee's breach of duty. The presence of these fact questions
would not seem to make the problem so speculative that the courts would be
justified in refusing to consider such applications for relief.10 In protecting traae
4

Vulcan Detinning Co. v. American Can Co., 75 N. J. Eq. 542, 73 A. 603

( 1 909).
5 Englestein v. Mintz, 345 Ill. 48, 177 N. E. 746 (1931); Jackson v. Jefferson,
171 Miss. 774, 158 So. 486 (1935); Teuscher v. Gregg, 136 Okla. 129, 276 P.
753 (1929); 3 BoGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 471 (1935).
6 See Gilpatrick v. Glidden, 81 Me. 137, 16 A. 464 (1888).
7 Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N. Y. 458, 164 N. E. 545 (1928}; Housewright v.
Steinke, 326 Ill. 398, 158 N. E. 138 (1927).
8 Parlin v. McClure, 169 Ga. 576, 150 S. E. 835 (1929); Jones v. Jones, 297
Mass. 198, 7 N. E. (2d) 1015 (1937).
9 Westervelt v. National Paper & Supply Co., 154 Ind. 673, 57 N. E. 552
(1900); Maas & Waldstein Co. v. Walker, 102 N. J. Eq. 328, 140 A. 921 (1928};
37 YALE L. J. II54 (1928).
10 This seemed to be the attitude of the court in the instant case, the principal
reason for its decision being that the defendant might have leased the property even
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secrets by means of injunctions, the courts must decide the very similar questions
whether the defendant discovered the secret independently or whether it was
wrongfully communicated to him.11 Therefore the real problem seems to be the
desirability of extending the policy of protecting trade secrets to such cases, and
this should not be difficult to answer once it is conceded that the policy itself
is sound.
E. George Rudolph

though it did not know of the results of the survey. It is submitted that a definite
finding of fact should have been made on this question.
11 Herold v. Herold China & Pottery Co., (C. C. A. 6th, (1919) 257 F. 911;
Witkop & Holmes Co. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 69 Misc. 90, 124 N. Y. S.
956 (1910).

